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Abstract
A major source of insurance coverage for non-elderly adults in the US is
employer-based health insurance market. Every participant of this market
gets a tax subsidy since premiums are excluded from taxable income. How-
ever, people have different incentives to participate in the employer-based
pool - since premiums are independent of individual risk, high-risk individ-
uals receive implicit cross-subsidies from low-risk individuals. In this paper
we explore several ways to reform the tax subsidy by taking this implicit
cross-subsidization into account. We construct a general equilibrium hetero-
geneous agents model and calibrate it using the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey Dataset. We find that even though the complete elimination of the
tax subsidy leads to the unraveling of the employer-based pool, there is still
room for substantial savings by targeting the tax subsidy. More specifically,
the same level of risk-sharing in the employer-based market can be achieved
at one third of the current costs if i) the tax subsidy is targeted only to-
wards low-risk people who have weak incentives to participate in the pool,
and ii) employer-based insurance premiums become age-adjusted. To im-
prove welfare outcome of this reform the tax subsidy should also be extended
to low-income individuals.
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1 Introduction
Most of the non-elderly adults in the US (63%) purchase health insurance in the
employer-based market.1 An important feature of this market is community rating, i.e.
the insurance premiums are independent of the health and age of individuals. In order for
the community-rated market to provide good risk-sharing there should be a significant
number of healthy people who are willing to participate. In the employer-based market an
important incentive to participate is provided by tax subsidies: employer-based premiums
are excluded from federal and state taxes. In 2009 the costs of this subsidy amounted to
$260 billion, making it the largest of the tax expenditures by the federal government and
the third largest expenditure on health care after Medicare ($400 billion) and Medicaid
($300 billion).2,3
In this paper we ask whether it is possible to reduce spending on tax subsidies with-
out destroying the employer-based pool. Our question is motivated by the observation
that every participant in the employer-based market gets a tax subsidy but people have
different incentives to participate in this pool. The employer-based pool involves sizeable
cross-subsidization from people with low expected medical costs (young and healthy) to
people with high expected medical costs (old and unhealthy). The former group pays
more and the latter group pays less for their health insurance than they would pay if
insurance premiums are adjusted for individual risks. As a consequence, people with high
expected medical costs have stronger incentives than people with low expected medical
costs to join the pool. Based on this observation we explore several ways to better tar-
get tax subsidies and evaluate the effects of these alternative subsidy schemes on tax
expenditures and risk-pooling in the employer-based market.
Our approach is based on a quantitative heterogeneous agents model augmented with
medical spending shocks. In the model, people can buy insurance against these shocks
in the individual or employer-based markets. An important difference between these two
markets is that in the former the premiums are risk-adjusted while in the latter there
is community-rating, meaning that healthy and unhealthy people are charged the same
premium. People are heterogeneous in their expected medical costs which creates differ-
ent incentives to participate in the community-rated market: people with low expected
costs may prefer to buy risk-adjusted insurance (or self-insure) while people with high
expected costs may prefer to participate in the community-rated pool. We also model
the differential treatment of health insurance embedded in the tax code: employer-based
premiums are excluded from taxable income while individual market premiums are not.
1Own calculations based on the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) dataset.
2The tax expenditure is the revenue losses attributable to various exclusions, exemptions, deductions
that reduce the income tax liabilities of individuals or businesses.
3Gruber (2011).
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We calibrate the model using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) dataset by
reproducing the empirical life-cycle patterns of employment and insurance coverage as
well as the key aggregate statistics in the U.S.
Our findings are as follows. First, we show that if tax exclusion is substituted by a
direct subsidy that is targeted only at people with weak incentives to participate in the
employer-based pool, the costs of subsidizing people with employer-based insurance can
be decreased by 74% without any damage to the risk-sharing. To achieve this outcome
the amount of the direct subsidy should depend on the risk-adjusted premium of each
individual. Even higher cost savings can be achieved if premiums in the group market be-
come age-adjusted, i.e. premiums can vary with age (but not with health). Since medical
costs increase quickly with age, community rating involves a sizeable cross-subsidization
from the young to the old. Therefore, a large amount of direct subsidies is needed in
order to motivate young people to participate in this pool. Allowing the premiums to be
age-adjusted reduces the size of cross-subsidization inside the pool, thus decreasing the
amount of direct subsidies needed to hold the pool together.
Second, using results from the direct subsidy scheme we explore how to reform the
current tax exclusion in order to obtain a similar outcome. We find that the reform
that maintains good risk-sharing in the employer-based pool while significantly reducing
the tax expenditures consists of two steps: i) allowing the premiums in the employer-
based market to be age-adjusted, and ii) giving tax subsidy only to those participants of
the employer-based pool who currently have low medical spending.4 Under this reform
the spending on the tax subsidy constitutes only a third (34.6%) of the amount in the
baseline economy and the tax rate decreases by one percentage point, while the take-up
rate of the employer-based insurance slightly increases (97.1% comparing to 94.2% in the
baseline). In contrast, if tax subsidy is completely eliminated the take-up rate goes down
to 6.3%. We repeat the analysis assuming the health reform described in the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) is implemented and find that the proposed tax subsidy reform achieves
a similar outcome.
Finally, our welfare analysis shows that the proposed tax subsidy reform achieves
much higher welfare gains if low-income people (those with income below 200% of the
Federal Poverty Line) are also allowed to keep the tax subsidy. This is because the best
risk-pooling is achieved when tax subsidies are targeted at low-risk people whereas the
best welfare outcomes are achieved when tax subsidies are targeted at low-income people.
Several studies examine the effects of the tax exclusion reform but none of them
investigates the possibilities of targeting the tax subsidy. Gruber (2011) uses a micro-
simulation model to evaluate the effect of tax exclusion removal and finds that this reform
4Since medical expenditures are persistent people with low current medical expenses have lower
expected expenses and thus they drive down the average premium in the employer-based market.
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substantially increases government revenue yet significantly decreases the insurance cov-
erage. Azawa and Fang (2012) focus on firms’ decisions to offer health insurance and find
that removal of tax exclusion slightly reduces the number of firms offering employer-based
insurance. The closest paper to ours is Jeske and Kitao (2009) who address this question
using a stochastic aging general equilibrium model featuring individuals heterogeneous in
their medical expense shocks. They find that eliminating tax exclusion results in a partial
collapse of the employer-based market due to the adverse selection problem. Similar to
Jeske and Kitao (2009), we focus on individual decisions related to health insurance but
allow for a full life cycle. Since the difference in expected medical expenses between the
young and the old is large, the premium in the employer-based market is very sensitive
to the age composition of the pool, and thus full life-cycle allows to better capture the
risk of the unravelling of the market.
Our paper belongs to a growing body of literature that augments the standard incom-
plete market model with medical expense shocks and health insurance markets. Among
others this literature includes work by Hansen et al (2011) who evaluate the quantita-
tive effects of introducing Medicare buy-in, Hsu (2013) who studies the effect of health
insurance on savings, Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2011) who examine the importance
of reclassification risk in the health insurance market.
We also contribute to the literature that examines the implications of government
policies related to health and health insurance market. This includes Attanasio, Kitao
and Violante (2011), Hai (2012), Kim (2012), Ozkan (2012), St-Amour (2012), Zhao
(2011). More broadly, we relate to the literature that studies the life-cycle behavior of
individuals in the presence of health uncertainty such as Capatina (2011), De Nardi et al
(2010), French and Jones (2011), Kopecky and Koreshkova (2013), and Prados (2012).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a simple model that illustrates
the intuition behind our results. Section 3 introduces the full model. Section 4 describes
our calibration. Section 5 evaluates the performance of the baseline model. Section 6
describes the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Simple Model
In this section we construct a simple model to illustrate the intuition behind our
results. In this simple framework we show how different subsidy schemes can be used to
keep together an insurance pool of individuals who are heterogeneous in their risks.
Consider a continuum of individuals who differ in their expected medical costs. We
denote an actuarial fair insurance price of an individual i by pi. Assume pi is uniformly
distributed over the interval [0, pH ], pi ∼ F (p). If all individuals participate in one
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insurance pool, the price in this pool will be equal to p =
pH∫
0
pdF (p) =
pH
2
. However,
this pool is unstable because individuals with pi < p want to drop out.
5 To prevent the
unraveling we need to introduce subsidies. First, we consider the case where the size of
the subsidy cannot be differentiated, i.e. every individual gets the same subsidy s. In
order to ensure full participation the subsidy must be equal to p to make an individual
with the lowest pi = 0 indifferent between staying or leaving, i.e. s = p. The total
spending on subsidies (TotSubs1) is equal to
TotSubs1 =
pH∫
0
sdF (p) =
p2H
2
.
Graphically it represents the shaded rectangle in Figure 1.
Second, consider the situation where the size of the subsidy can be differentiated. In
this case each individual gets a subsidy si = max {0, p− pi}. Thus, only individuals with
pi < p will get the subsidy and the size of the subsidy decreases in pi. The total spending
on subsidies is equal to
TotSubs2 =
pH∫
0
sidF (p) =
p2H
8
.
Graphically it represents the shaded triangle in Figure 2. Note that the total spending
on subsidies can be reduced by four times by taking into account that individuals differ
in their incentives to participate in the pool.
si
pi
pH
2
pH
2
pH
Figure 1: Total subsidy spending if everyone gets
the same subsidy
si
pipH
2
pH
pH
2
Figure 2: Total subsidy spending if subsidy de-
pends on pi
To illustrate the importance of pool heterogeneity for subsidy spending, consider
another example. Assume that there are two insurance pools instead of one: people with
pi < p participate in the first pool, and people with pi ≥ p - in the second. The prices in
5We assume individuals are free to buy health insurance at risk-adjusted prices.
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the first pool (p1) and in the second pool (p2) are equal to
pH
4
and
3pH
4
correspondingly.6
Consider the total subsidy spending needed to ensure full participation in each pool.
If the subsidy is uniform, every individual in the first pool should get a subsidy equal to
p1 − 0 =
pH
4
, and that in the second pool should receive p2 − p =
pH
4
. Thus, the total
spending needed to keep the pools together are:
TotSubs3 =
pH
4
p∫
0
dF (p)+
pH
4
pH∫
p
dF (p) =
p2H
4
Graphically it represents two small shaded rectangles in Figure 3.
In case of the differentiated subsidy, people in the first pool get a subsidy equal to
s1i =max {0, p1 − pi} and people in the second pool - s
2
i =max {0, p2 − pi}. The total
spending on subsidies is equal to
TotSubs4 =
p∫
0
s1idF (p)+
pH∫
p
s2idF (p) =
p2H
16
Graphically it represents two shaded triangles in Figure 4.
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Figure 3: Total subsidy spending if there are two
insurance pools and everyone gets the same subsidy
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2
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Figure 4: Total subsidy spending if there are two
insurance pools and subsidy depends on pi
Table 1 summarizes the total subsidy spending in the four cases considered above.
An important result is that moving from the uniform to differentiated subsidy can sub-
stantially reduce the total spending needed to ensure the full participation in the pool.
These savings arise from withdrawing subsidies from people who are willing to partic-
ipate even when they are not subsidized, i.e. people with pi > p. Another result is
6These prices are determined in the following way:
p1 =
1
Pr(p < p)
p∫
0
pdF (p) =
pH
4
and p2 =
1
Pr(p ≥ p)
pH∫
p
pdF (p) =
3pH
4
.
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that it is much cheaper to ensure full participation if there are two smaller insurance
pools instead of one big pool. This is because in the two smaller pools people are less
heterogeneous in their risks, thus the size of cross-subsidization from low risk to high risk
is smaller. In particular, in the one big pool the difference in risk-adjusted premiums
between the highest and the lowest risks is pH , while that in the two smaller pools is
p = pH − p =
pH
2
. Therefore, a smaller direct subsidy is needed to make low-risk people
willing to cross-subsidize high-risk people.
One Pool Two pools
Uniform subsidy p2H/2 p
2
H/4
Differentiated subsidy p2H/8 p
2
H/16
Table 1: Total spending on subsidies for different subsidy schemes
3 Baseline Model
3.1 Households
3.1.1 Demographics and preferences
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. An individual
lives to a maximum of N periods. During the first R − 1 periods of life an individual
can choose whether to work or not; at age R all individuals retire. We denote the labor
supply decision of a household by lt, lt ∈
{
0, l
}
.
Agents are endowed with one unit of time that can be used for either leisure or work.
There is a fixed cost of work φt,e treated as a loss of leisure. Thus a working individual’
leisure time can be expressed as 1 − l − φt,e. The fixed cost of work depends on age
(t) and education (e). In addition, individuals in bad health incur higher costs of work:
φt,e = φ1(t, e) + φ2(t, e)1{health=bad} where 1{.} is an indicator function mapping to one if
its argument is true, while φ1(t, e) and φ2(t, e) are non-negative functions.
We assume the Cobb-Douglas specification for preferences over consumption and
leisure:
u(ct, lt) =
(
cχt
(
1− lt − φt,e1{lt>0}
)1−χ)1−σ
1− σ
.
Here χ is a parameter which determines the relative importance of consumption, and σ
is the risk-aversion over the consumption-leisure composite.
Agents discount the future at the rate β and survive till the next period with condi-
tional probability ζt, which depends on age and health. We assume that the savings (net
of out-of-pocket medical expenses) of each household who does not survive are equally
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allocated among all survived agents of a working age within the same educational group.
The population grows at the rate η.
3.1.2 Health expenditures and health insurance
In each period an agent faces a stochastic medical expenditure shock xt which evolves
according to a Markov process G(xt+1|xt, t). We categorize individuals into two groups
based on their medical expenses. Individuals with low medical expenses (xt ≤ xt) are
referred to as “healthy”or “people in good health”, while individuals with high medical
expenses (xt > xt) are referred to as “unhealthy”or “people in bad health”. Here xt is a
threshold separating people into these two groups.
Every working age individual can buy health insurance (HI) against a medical shock in
the individual health insurance market. The price of health insurance in the individual
market is a function of the agent’s current medical shock and age, and is denoted by
pI (xt, t).
In each period with some probability Probt an agent of working age gets an offer
to buy employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI). The variable gt characterizes the
status of the offer: gt = 1 if an individual gets an offer, and gt = 0 if he does not. All
participants of the employer-based pool are charged the same premium p regardless of
their current medical expenses and age. An employer pays a fraction ψ of this premium.
If the worker chooses to buy group insurance, he only pays p where:
p = (1− ψ) p.
Low-income individuals of working age can obtain their health insurance from Med-
icaid for free. There are two pathways to qualify for Medicaid. First, an individual can
become eligible if his total income is below threshold ycat. Second, an individual can
become eligible through the Medically Needy program. This happens if his total income
minus medical expenses is below threshold yneed and his assets are less than the limit
kpub.
We use it to index the current health insurance status as follows:
it =

0 ; if uninsured
1 ; if insured by Mediciad
2 ; if privately insured

All types of insurance contracts - group, individual, and public - provide only par-
tial insurance against medical expenditure shocks. We denote the fraction of medical
expenditures covered by the insurance contract by q (xt, it). This fraction is a function
of medical expenditures and the type of insurance of a household.
8
All retired households are enrolled in the Medicare program. The Medicare program
charges a fixed premium of pmed and covers a fraction qmed of medical costs.
3.1.3 Labor income
Households differ by their educational attainment e. Educational attainment can take
two values: e = 1 corresponds to the absence of any degree, whereas e = 2 corresponds
to at least a high-school degree.7 Earnings are equal to w˜ze,xt lt, where w˜ is wage and
ze,xt is the idiosyncratic productivity that depends on educational level (e), age (t) and
medical expenses (xt) of an individual.
3.1.4 Taxation and social transfers
All households pay an income tax that consists of two parts: a progressive tax denoted
by T (yt) and a proportional tax denoted by τ y.
8 The taxable income yt is based on both
labor and capital income. Working households also pay payroll taxes, namely Medicare
tax (τmed) and Social Security tax (τ ss). The Social Security tax rate for earnings above
yss is zero. The U.S. tax code allows each household to subtract out-of-pocket medical
expenditures that exceed 7.5% of their income when the taxable income is calculated.
In addition, the ESHI premium (p) is excluded from the taxable income for both income
and payroll taxes. Consumption is taxed at a proportional rate τ c.
We also assume a public safety-net program, T SIt . The program guarantees that every
household will have a minimum consumption level at c. This reflects the option available
to U.S. households with a bad combination of income and medical shocks to rely on
public transfer programs such as food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, and un-
compensated care.9 Retired households receive Social Security benefits sse that depend
on educational attainment e.
3.1.5 Optimization problem
Working age households (t < R) The state variables for the working age household’s
optimization problem are capital (kt ∈ K =R
+ ∪ {0}), medical cost shock (xt ∈ X =R
+ ∪ {0}),
idiosyncratic labor productivity (ze,xt ∈ Z =R
+), ESHI offer status (gt ∈ G = {0, 1}), health
insurance status (it ∈ I = {0, 1, 2}), educational attainment (e ∈ E = {1, 2}) and age (t).
7We allow for educational heterogeneity because the data shows that people without any degree have
substantially lower income and lower ESHI coverage than people with at least a high school degree.
8The progressive part T (yt) approximates the actual income tax schedule in the U.S., while the
proportional tax represents all other taxes that we do not model explicitly. In this approach we follow
Jeske and Kitao (2009).
9In 2004 85% of uncompensated care were paid by the government. The major portion is sourced
from the disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payment (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004).
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In each period a household chooses consumption (ct), labor supply (lt) , savings (kt+1) ,
and health insurance status for the next period (i′H). If an individual is eligible for
Medicaid, he can get free public insurance (we call this option M). If he works in a firm
offering ESHI, he can buy a group insurance (G) . In addition, everyone can choose to
be uninsured (U), or buy individual insurance (I). We can summarize those choices as
follows. If an individual is eligible for Medicaid:
i′H =
{
{M, I,G} ; if gt = 1 and lt > 0
{M, I} ; if gt = 0 or lt = 0
}
. (1)
Otherwise
i′H =
{
{U, I, G} ; if gt = 1 and lt > 0
{U, I} ; if gt = 0 or lt = 0
}
. (2)
The value function of a working-age individual can be written as follows:
Vt,e (kt, xt, z
e,x
t , gt, it) = max
kt+1,ct,lt,i′H
u (ct, lt) + βζ tEtVt+1,e
(
kt+1, xt+1, z
e,x
t+1, gt+1,it+1
)
(3)
subject to
kt (1 + r) + w˜ z
e,x
t lt + T
SI
t +Beqe = (1 + τ c) ct+ kt+1 + xt (1− q (xt, it)) + Pt+ Tax (4)
w˜ =
{
w ; if gt = 0
(w − cE) ; if gt = 1
}
(5)
Pt =

0 ; if i′H ∈ {U,M}
pI (xt, t) ; if i
′
H = I
p ; if i′H = G
 (6)
it+1 =

0 ; if i′H = U
1 ; if i′H =M
2 ; if i′H ∈ {I, G}
 (7)
Tax = T (yt)+τ yyt+τmed
(
w˜ze,xt lt − p1{i′H=G}
)
+τ ssmin
(
w˜ze,xt lt − p1{i′H=G}
, yss
)
(8)
yt = rkt + w˜z
e,x
t lt − p1{i′H=G}
−max (0, xt (1− q (xt, it))− 0.075 (w˜z
e,x
t lt + rkt)) (9)
T SIt = max (0, (1 + τ c) c+ xt (1− q (xt, it)) + Tax− w˜z
e,x
t lt − kt (1 + r)−Beqe) . (10)
An individual is eligible for Medicaid if{
ytott ≤ y
cat or
ytott − xt (1− q (xt, it)) ≤ y
need and kt ≤ k
pub
}
10
ytott = rkt + w˜ z
e,x
t lt
The conditional expectation on the right-hand side of Equation (3) is over
{
xt+1, z
e,x
t+1, gt+1
}
.
Equation (4) is the budget constraint and Beqe is accidental bequest. In Equation (5),
w is wage per effective labor unit. If the household has an ESHI coverage, his employer
pays a part of his insurance premium. We assume that the employer who offers ESHI
passes these costs onto the employees by deducting an amount cE from the wage per
effective labor unit, as shown in (5). Equation (7) maps the current HI choice into the
next period HI status. In Equation (8) , the first two terms are income taxes and the
last two terms are payroll taxes.10 Note that contributions by both the employer and
employee towards the ESHI premium are excluded from the taxable income.
Retired households For a retired household (t ≥ R) the state variables are capital
(kt), medical expenses shock (xt), educational attainment (e), and age (t).
11
Vt,e (kt, xt) = max
kt+1,ct
u (ct, 0) + βζtEtVt+1,e (kt+1, xt+1) (11)
subject to
kt (1 + r) + sse + T
SI
t = (1 + τ c) ct + kt+1 + xt (1− qmed) + pmed + Tax
Tax = T (yt) + τ yyt
yt = rkt + sse −max (0, xt (1− qmed)− 0.075 (sse + rkt))
T SIt = max (0, (1 + τ c) c+ xt (1− qmed (xt)) + Tax+ pmed − sse − kt (1 + r)) .
Distribution of households To simplify the notation, let S define the space of a
household’s state variables, where S = K × Z × X×G × I × E × T for working-age
households and S = K×X×E×T for retired households. Let s ∈ S, and denote by Γ(s)
the distribution of households over the state-space.
3.2 Production sector
There are two stand-in firms which act competitively. Their production functions
are Cobb-Douglas, AKαL1−α, where K and L are aggregate capital and aggregate labor
and A is the total factor productivity. The first stand-in firm offers ESHI to its workers
but the second one does not. Under competitive behavior, the second firm pays each
10In practice, employers contribute 50% of Medicare and Social Security taxes. For simplicity, we
assume that employees pay 100% of payroll taxes.
11The problem of a newly retired household is slightly different since he is still under insurance coverage
from the previous period. Thus, it is an additional state variable and out-of-pocket medical expenses
are xt (1− q (xt, it)).
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employee his marginal product of labor. Since capital is freely allocated between the two
firms, the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the capital-labor ratios of both
firms are the same. Consequently, we have
w = (1− α)AKαL−α, (12)
r = αAKα−1L1−α − δ, (13)
where δ is the depreciation rate.
The first firm has to partially finance the health insurance premium for its employees.
The cost is passed on to its employees through a wage reduction. In specifying this wage
reduction, we follow Jeske and Kitao (2009) . The first firm subtracts an amount cE from
the marginal product per effective labor unit. The zero profit condition implies
cE =
ψp
(∫
1{i′H (s)=G}
Γ (s)
)
∫
ltz
e,x
t 1{gt=1}Γ (s)
. (14)
The numerator is the total contributions towards insurance premiums paid by the first
firm. The denominator is the total effective labor working in the first firm.
3.3 Insurance sector
Health insurance companies in both private and group markets act competitively. We
assume that insurers can observe all state variables that determine the expected medical
expenses of the individuals. Based on this assumption and the zero profit conditions we
can write the insurance premiums in the following way:
pI (xt, t) = (1 + r)
−1γEM (xt, t) + pi (15)
for the non-group insurance market and
p = (1 + r)−1
γ
(∫
1{i′H (s)=G}
EM (xt, t) Γ (s)
)
∫
1{i′H (s)=G}
Γ (s)
(16)
for the group insurance market. Here, EM (xt, t) is the expected medical cost of an
individual of age t with current medical costs xt that will be covered by the insurance
company:
EM (xt, t) =
∫
xt+1q (xt+1, 2)G(xt+1|xt, t).
12
γ is a markup on prices due to the administrative costs in the individual and group
markets; pi is the fixed costs of buying an individual policy.12 The premium in the non-
group insurance market is based on the discounted expected medical expenditure of an
individual buyer. The premium for group insurance is based on a weighted average of
the expected medical costs of those who buy group insurance.
3.4 Government constraint
We assume that the government runs a balanced budget. This implies∫
[Tax (s) + τ cct (s)] Γ (s)−G = (17)∫
t≥R
[sse + qmedxt − pmed] Γ (s) +
∫
T SIt Γ (s) +
∫
t<R
1{i′H=M}
q (xt, 1)xtΓ (s)
The left-hand side is the total tax revenue from all households net of the exogenous
government expenditures (G). The first term on the right-hand side is the net expen-
ditures on Social Security and Medicare for retired households. The second term is the
costs of guaranteeing the minimum consumption floor for households. The last term is
the costs of Medicaid.
3.5 Definition of stationary competitive equilibrium
Given the government programs
{
c, sse, qmed, pmed, y
cat, yneed, kpub, G
}
, the fraction of
medical costs covered by private insurers and Medicaid {q (xt, it)} , and the employ-
ers’ contribution (ψ) , the competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of a set of
time-invariant prices {w, r, p, pI (xt, t)}, wage reduction {cE}, households’ value functions
{Vt,e (s)} , decision rules of working-age households {kt+1 (s) , ct (s) , lt (s) , i
′
H (s)} and re-
tired households {ct (s) , kt+1 (s)} as well as the tax functions {T (y) , τ y, τmed, τ ss, τ c}
such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Given the set of prices and the tax functions, the decision rules solve the households’
optimization problems in equations (3) and (11).
2. Wage (w) and rent (r) satisfy equation (12) and (13) , where
K =
∫
kt+1 (s) Γ (s) +
∫
t<R
[
1{i′H(s)=G}
p+ 1{i′H (s)=I}
(pI (x, t)− pi)
]
Γ (s) ,
L =
∫
t<R
ze,xt lt (s) Γ (s) .
12Fixed costs capture the difference in overhead costs for individual and group policies.
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3. cE satisfies equation (14), thus the firm offering ESHI earns zero profit.
4. The non-group insurance premiums pI (xt, t) satisfy equation (15), and the group
insurance premium satisfies equation (16), so health insurance companies earn zero
profit.
5. The tax functions {T (y) , τ y, τmed, τ ss, τ c} balance the government budget (17).
4 Data and calibration
4.1 Data
We calibrated the model using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) dataset.
The MEPS contains detailed records on demographics, income, medical costs and insur-
ance for a nationally representative sample of households. It consists of two-year overlap-
ping panels and covers the period of 1996-2008. We use nine waves of the MEPS between
1999 and 2008.
The MEPS links people into one household based on their eligibility for coverage
under a typical family insurance plan. This Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU)
defined in the MEPS dataset corresponds to our definition of a household. All statistics
we use were computed for the head of the HIEU. We define the head as the male with
the highest income in the HIEU. If the HIEU does not have a male member, we assign
the female with the highest income as its head. We use the longitudinal weights provided
in the MEPS to compute all the statistics. Since each wave represent population each
year, the weight of each individual was divided by nine in the pooled sample.
In our sample we include all household heads who are at least 24 years old and have
non-negative labor income (to be defined later). We use 2002 as the base year. All level
variables were normalized to the base year using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
4.2 Demographics, preferences and technology
In the model, agents are born at the age of 25 and can live to a maximum age of 99.
The model period is one year so the maximum lifespan N is 75. Agents retire at the age
of 65, so R is 41.
To adjust conditional survival probabilities ζt for the difference in medical expenses
we follow Attanasio et al. (2011). In particular, we use Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) and MEPS to estimate the difference in survival probabilities for people in different
medical expense categories and use it to adjust the male life tables from the Social
Security Administration.13 The population growth rate was set to 1.35% to match the
13More details are available in Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013b).
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fraction of people older than 65 in the data.
We set the consumption share in the utility function χ to 0.6 which is in the range
estimated by French (2005).14 The parameter σ is set to 5 which corresponds to the
risk-aversion over consumption equal to 3.4 which is in the range commonly used in the
life-cycle literature.15 The discount factor β is calibrated to match the aggregate capital
output ratio of 3. We set the labor supply of those who choose to work (l) to 0.4
Fixed leisure costs of work φt,e are calibrated to match the employment profiles in
each educational and health group.16 More specifically, we assume that the fixed costs for
people in good health φ1(t, e) do not vary with age and use this parameter to match the
employment rate for the age group 55-59 for each educational group. For the additional
fixed costs of people with bad health φ2(t, e), we assume it is a linear function of age. For
each educational group we adjust the intercept and the slope of this function to match
two moments: the employment rate of people in the 25-29 and 55-59 age groups who
have bad health.17 The resulting fixed costs are presented in Table 2.
High-school dropouts HS and College graduates
φ1 0.2800 0.2650
φ2 intercept 0.0200 0.0450
φ2 slope 0.0008 0.0025
Table 2: Parameters characterizing disutility from work
The Cobb-Douglas function parameter α is set at 0.33, which corresponds to the
capital income share in the US. The annual depreciation rate δ is calibrated to achieve
an interest rate of 4% in the baseline economy. The total factor productivity A is set
such that the total output equals one in the baseline model.
4.3 Insurance status
In the MEPS the question about the source of insurance coverage is asked retro-
spectively for each month of the year. We define a person as having employer-based
insurance if he reports having ESHI for at least eight months during the year (variables
PEGJA-PEGDE). The same criterion is used when defining public insurance (variables
PUBJA-PUBDE) and individual insurance status (variables PRIJA-PRIDE). For those
14Given that we have indivisible labor supply we cannot pin down this parameter using a moment in
the data.
15The relative risk aversion over consumption is given by −cucc/uc = 1− χ(1 − σ).
16We define a person as employed if he works at least 520 hours per year, earns at least $2,678 per
year in base year dollars (this corresponds to working at least 10 hours per week and earning a minimum
wage of $5.15 per hour), and does not report being retired or receiving Social Security benefits.
17We estimate fixed costs of work jointly with the labor income process. The estimation of the labor
income process is explained in more details in section 4.8.
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few individuals who switch sources of coverage during a year, we use the following defini-
tion of insurance status. If a person has both ESHI and individual insurance in one year,
with each coverage lasting for less than eight months but the total duration of coverage
for more than eight months, we classify this person as individually insured. Likewise,
when a person has a combination of individual and public coverage that altogether lasts
for more than eight months, we define that individual as having public insurance.18
4.4 Medical expenditures
Medical costs in our model correspond to the total paid medical expenditures in
the MEPS dataset (variable TOTEXP). These include not only out-of-pocket medical
expenses but also the costs covered by insurers. In our calibration medical expense shock
is approximated by a 5-state discrete Markov process. For each age, we divide the medical
expenditures into 5 bins, corresponding to the 30th, 60th, 90th and 99th percentiles. To
get a value of medical expenses in each bin we run a regression of medical expenses
on a set of age and year dummies. The coefficients on age dummies in this regression
correspond to the average medical expenses for the corresponding age in a particular
bin. Then we fit our estimated coefficients with a cubic function of age.19 The resulting
profiles are shown in Figure (5).
25 35 45 55 65 75 85 95
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Medical expenses by medical class
Age
M
ed
ica
l e
xp
en
se
s,
 0
00
$
 
 
Fitted polynomial
Estimated coefficients
Figure 5: Medical expenses for each bin
We set xt that separates people into different medical expenses categories to the 90th
18The results do not significantly change if we change the cutoff point to 6 or 12 months.
19The MEPS tends to underestimate the aggregate medical expenditures (Sing et al, 2002). To
account for this we compare the average medical expenses between the MEPS and the National Health
Expenditure Account (NHEA) in 2002. The downward bias in the medical expenses from the MEPS is
much larger for the elderly (particulary after age 75) than for the young. Because of this, we multiply
our estimated medical expenses by 1.37 for people younger than 75 years old and by 1.93 for people
older than 75 years old. This adjustment allows us to match the share of total expenses in GDP (12.6%)
and the share of medical expenses of people younger than 65 in GDP (6.5%) as in NHEA.
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percentile of medical expenses distribution of the corresponding age. In other words,
people whose medical expenses are in the lowest three bins are classified as healthy, while
people whose medical expenses are in the highest two bins are classified as unhealthy. To
construct the transition matrix we measure the fraction of people who move from one bin
to another between two consecutive years separately for people of working age (25-64)
and for retirees (older than 65).
We use MEPS to estimate the fraction of medical expenses covered by insurance
policies q (xt, it).
20 For retired households we set qmed to 0.5 following Jeske and Kitao
(2009) and Attanasio et al (2011).
4.5 Government
In calibrating the tax function T (y) we use a nonlinear function specified by Gouveia
and Strauss (1994):
T (y) = a0
[
y − (y−a1 + a2)
−1/a1
]
This functional form is commonly used in the quantitative macroeconomic literature
(for example, Conesa and Krueger, 2006; Jeske and Kitao, 2009). In this functional form
a0 controls the marginal tax rate faced by the highest income group, a1 determines the
curvature of marginal taxes and a2 is a scaling parameter. We set a0 and a1 to the original
estimates as in Gouveia and Strauss (1994), which are 0.258 and 0.768 correspondingly.
The parameter a2 is used to balance the government budget in the baseline economy.
We set proportional income tax τ y to 6.62% to match the fact that around 65% of
tax revenues come from income taxes that are approximated in our calibration by the
progressive function T (y). When considering policy experiments we keep a2 as in the
baseline economy, and adjust τ y to balanced the government budget.
The minimum consumption floor c is set to $2,700 following the estimates of De Nardi
et al. (2010). The Social Security replacement rates were set to 40% and 30% of the
average labor income for people with low and high education correspondingly, reflecting
the progressivity of the system.
Medicaid eligibility rules were taken from the data. The income eligibility threshold
for general Medicaid (ycat) is set to 64% of FPL which is the median value for this
threshold among all states in 2009. The income eligibility threshold for the Medically
Needy program (yneed) and asset test for this program (kpub) are set to 53% of FPL
and $2,000 correspondingly. These numbers are equal to the median values for the
corresponding eligibility criteria in 2009 in the states that have Medically Needy program.
The Medicare, Social Security and consumption tax rates were set to 2.9%, 12.4%
20The calibration of medical expenses shock and insurance reimbursement ratios is detailed in
Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013b).
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and 5.67% correspondingly. The maximum taxable income for Social Security is set to
$84,900. The fraction of exogenous government expenses in GDP is 18%.
4.6 Insurance sector
The share of health insurance premium paid by the firm (ψ) was chosen to match
the aggregate ESHI take-up rate.21 The resulting number (76.3%) is consistent with
the one observed in the U.S. economy, which is in the range of 75-85% (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2009).
We set the proportional loads for group and individual insurance policies (γ) to 1.11
(Kahn et al., 2005). The fixed costs of buying an individual policy pi is set to $23 to
match the aggregate fraction of people with individual insurance.
4.7 Offer rate
We assume that probability of getting an offer of ESHI coverage is a logistic function22:
Probt =
exp(ut)
1 + exp(ut)
,
where the variable ut is an odds ratio that takes the following form:
ut = η
e
0 + η
e
1 log(inct ) + η
e
2 [log(inct )]
2 + ηe3 [log(inct )]
3 + ηe41{gt−1=1} +Θ
eDt (18)
Here ηe0, η
e
1, η
e
2, η
e
3, η
e
4 and Θ
e are education-specific coefficients, inct is individual labor
income (normalized by the average labor income), and Dt is a set of year dummy vari-
ables.23 To construct the initial offer rate (g1 in equation (18)) we run a separate logistic
regression for people aged 24-26 which includes dummies for medical expenses categories
but not offer in the previous period.24
21In this paper we use the term “take-up rate”only in relation to the employer-based market, and it
defines the fraction of people among those with an ESHI offer who choose to buy group insurance.
22In our estimation we assume that an individual has an offer if any member of his HIEU reports having
an offer in at least two out of three interview rounds during a year (variables OFFER31x, OFFER42x,
OFFER53x). In addition, we exclude household heads whose income was below $1,000 when estimating
the logistic regression.
23The model’s counterpart of the variable inct is individual productivity divided by the average pro-
ductivity (ze,xt /z).
24In all experiments the offer probability is the same as in the baseline. Aizawa and Fang (2012) use
an equilibrium search model to examine how firms offering ESHI would respond if the tax subsidy is
removed. They find only a small change in the equilibrium offer rate.
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4.8 Labor income
We divide households into two educational groups: high-school dropouts and people
with at least a high-school degree. The fraction of each group in the population is 15%
and 85% correspondingly. Individuals with different education and health have different
productivity, which is specified as follows:
ze,xt = λ
e,x
t exp(vt) exp(ξt) (19)
where λe,xt is the deterministic function of age, education and health, and
vt = ρvt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε) (20)
ξt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ξ)
For the persistent shock vt we set ρ to 0.98 and σ
2
ε to 0.018 following the incomplete
market literature (Storesletten et al (2004); Hubbard et al (1994); Erosa et al (2011);
French (2005)). We set the variance of the transitory shock (σ2ξ) to 0.1 which is in the
range estimated by Erosa et al (2011). In our computation we discretize the stochastic
shocks vt and ξt using the method in Floden (2008).
25 To construct the distribution of
newborn individuals, we draw v1 in equation (20) from N(0, 0.124) distribution following
Heathcote et al. (2010).
To identify the deterministic part of productivity λe,xt we need to take into account
the fact that in the data we only observe labor income of workers but not the potential
income of non-workers. At the same time, the fraction of non-workers is substantially
higher among people with low education and those with bad health. To address this
problem we adopt the method developed by French (2005) which is described in detail in
Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013a). We start by estimating the average labor income
profiles of workers from the MEPS dataset.26 Then we estimate λe,xt in equation (19)
inside the model in order to reproduce the average labor income profile of workers as in
the data. The advantage of this approach is that we can reconstruct the productivity
ze,xt of individuals whom we do not observe working in the data. Figure (6) plots the
labor income profiles of workers in the data and in the model, and compares them with
25We use 9 grid points for vt and 2 grid points for ξt. The grid of vt is expanding to capture the
increasing cross-sectional variance. Our discretized process for vt generates the autocorrelation of 0.98
and 0.016 for its innovation variance.
26Household labor income is defined as the sum of wages (variable WAGEP) and 75% of the income
from business (variable BUSNP). This definition is the same as the one used in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics Dataset (PSID), which has been commonly used for income calibration in the macroeconomic
literature. Our age profiles for labor income can be interpreted as the average income among cohorts
living during 1998-2008
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the average potential labor income computed for everyone in the model.27 Our estimates
show that the average labor income that includes potential income of non-workers is lower
than that of only workers because people with low productivity tend to drop out from
the employment pool. In other words, if we do not use the correction described above
we would overestimate the labor income for non-participating individuals and this bias
is especially strong in the case of unhealthy people and people at pre-retirement age. We
also find that unhealthy people are inherently less productive. The drop in productivity
due to bad health depends on age but it can be as high as 22% for high-school dropouts
and as high as 15% for people with at least a high-school degree.
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Figure 6: Average labor income of workers (data and model) and of everyone (model). The latter
profile averages out over actual labor income of workers and potential labor income for non-workers.
Table 9 in Appendix A summarizes the parametrization of the baseline model.
27Note, that when constructing the latter profile we include actual labor income of workers and
potential labor income of non-workers, which is positive even though their actual income is zero.
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5 Baseline model performance
Figure (7) compares the employment profiles observed in the data with the ones
generated by the model. The model closely tracks the employment profiles for each
educational and health group though it slightly overestimates the employment rate of
the youngest group because we abstract from labor market frictions.
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Figure 7: Employment profiles for people with low education (left panel) and high education (right
panel): data vs. model
Table 3 compares the aggregate health insurance statistics generated by the model
with the ones observed in the data. The model was calibrated to match the ESHI take-
up rates and individual insurance rates. However, the model also produces the fraction
of uninsured and publicly insured close to the data. The last four columns of Table 3
show insurance statistics by educational groups. Our model does not target any of these
statistics, but it still fares well along these dimensions.
All Low education High education
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Insured by ESHI (%) 63.0 64.4 33.3 29.1 68.5 70.6
Individually insured (%) 7.6 7.3 5.5 3.8 8.0 8.0
Uninsured (%) 20.2 19.7 39.5 43.2 16.6 15.6
Publicly insured (%) 9.2 8.6 21.7 23.8 6.9 5.9
ESHI take-up rate (%) 94.3 94.2 85.9 81.6 93.9 95.3
Offer rate (%) 67.6 68.3 38.8 35.7 72.9 74.1
Group premium/avg.income (%) 7.0 6.7 - - - -
Table 3: Insurance statistics: data vs. model
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The top panel of Figure (8) plots the percentages of the uninsured and publicly insured
in the model and in the data respectively. For both educational groups, the model can
capture the corresponding empirical profiles. There is an overprediction in the number of
publicly insured for people of preretirement age due to our simplified Medicaid eligibility
criteria. The bottom panel of Figure (8) compares the life-cycle profiles of the fraction
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Figure 8: Percent of uninsured and publicly insured (top panel) and privately insured (bottom panel),
data vs. model
of people with private insurance for different educational groups in the model and in the
data. The model reproduces the general life-cycle pattern and differences in educational
group in insurance rates. However, for low educated people it underestimates the fraction
of people with ESHI among the older group due to our overestimation of the fraction
of the publicly insured for this age category. The model also tends to underpredict the
fraction of people with individual insurance among young low-educated people because
we assume only one choice of plan in the individual insurance market.
Our model also produces a reasonable number of poor people: the fraction of people
(including retirees) with assets less than $1,000 is 10.9%. In the data this number is
11.1% in 2004 according to Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) (Kennickell, 2006).
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5.1 Price elasticity of the demand for group health insurance
In this paper we study the possible consequences of the tax exclusion reform so it is
important that our model captures the price elasticity of the demand for group health
insurance. To compute price elasticity in our model we consider how much the take-up
rate changes in response to changes in the ESHI premium, and then compute the implied
elasticity.28 We find that the price elasticity in our model is non-linear, i.e. its magnitude
depends on how much we change the ESHI premium compared to the baseline case. To
make our elasticity comparable to micro estimates we construct experiments where we
change the premium in the same way as in the studies we consider. More specifically,
Chernew et al (1997) simulate the change in the take-up rate in response to 50% subsidy
to the out-of-pocket ESHI premium and their implied elasticity is -0.072. Based on
the same change in the premium our model produces elasticity of -0.11.29 Gruber and
Washington (2005) estimate the sensitivity of the ESHI take-up rate to the share of after
tax employee costs in total premiums.30 They consider the introduction of tax exclusions
of employee’s contributions for federal employees and find elasticity equal to -0.02. The
policy episode they consider is equivalent to lowering the share of employee contribution
by around 10%. Constructing an equivalent experiment we find the elasticity of take-up
rate with respect to after tax share of employee premium equal to -0.08. Overall, the
elasticities produced by our model are broadly consistent with the micro estimates.
6 Results
This section is organized as follows. In Section 6.1 we illustrate the role of the
existing tax subsidies in preventing the ESHI pool from unraveling. Next, in Section 6.2,
we construct the following policy experiment: instead of the current tax exclusion we
introduce an individually-adjusted direct subsidy that only goes to individuals who will
leave the pool if not subsidized. The subsidy scheme in this experiment is comparable
to the simple example in Section 2. Our main goal in constructing this experiment is
to understand how the ESHI take-up and total subsidy spending change comparing to
the baseline economy. In Section 6.3, we propose a reform of the current tax subsidy
that aims to mimic the allocation of transfers as in the case of the individually-adjusted
direct subsidies. The effects of this tax subsidy reform after the implementation of the
28The elasticity is equal to 100% ∗
∆Takeup
Takeup
/
∆Premium
Premium
.
29In all our experiments we consider a partial equilibrium environment, i.e. we do not allow the change
in the composition of the ESHI pool to have feedback effects on premiums. We do this to be consistent
with the way the micro studies we consider construct their elasticity.
30This share is defined as
Employee′s contribution− Tax savings
Total premium
. Here tax savings is the reduction
in tax liability resulting from the tax exclusion of the ESHI premium.
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Affordable Care Act (ACA) is discussed in Section 6.4. Finally, we discuss the welfare
effects of this tax reform in Section 6.5.
6.1 The role of the tax exclusion in keeping the ESHI pool
together
To understand the role of the current tax subsidies in keeping the ESHI pool together
we consider an experiment where the ESHI premium is not excluded from taxable income.
In this case the total taxable income in equation (9) is determined in the following way:
yNDt = rkt+w˜z
e,x
t lt+ψp1{i′H=G}
−max (0, xt (1− q (xt, it))− 0.075 (w˜z
e,x
t lt + rkt)) (21)
The total amount of tax is now determined as follows:
TaxND = T
(
yNDt
)
+τ yy
ND
t +τmed
(
w˜ze,xt lt + ψp1{i′H=G}
)
+τ ssmin
(
w˜ze,xt lt + ψp1{i′H=G}
, yss
)
(22)
Note that comparing to equations (8) and (9), people who buy ESHI now have to count
both the employee’s and employer’s contributions as a part of their taxable income. For
people who do not buy ESHI, the tax code stays the same.
ESI take-up (%) Subsidy Tax rate Agg K
All LE HE (% BS) τ y (%) (% BS)
Baseline 94.2 81.6 95.3 100.0 6.86 100.0
1. No tax subsidy 6.3 4.0 6.5 0.0 6.07 103.8
2. Differentiated subs. 85.4 53.3 88.1 26.4 5.93 100.4
3. Differentiated subs.+age-adjusted CR 90.0 62.6 92.4 16.2 5.66 102.1
Table 4: The effect of differentiated direct tax subsidy: the ESHI take-up rates and total spending on
subsidies. LE (HE) denotes groups with low (high) education, BS denotes the baseline.
Employment (%) Insurance (%)
All LE HE Unins Indiv MCD
Baseline 89.7 75.6 92.2 19.7 7.3 8.6
1. No tax subsidy 86.9 74.7 89.2 62.4 22.7 10.8
2. Differentiated subs. 88.8 75.3 91.2 26.3 7.0 9.2
3. Differentiated subs.+age-adjusted CR 88.6 75.4 90.9 23.4 7.1 9.2
Table 5: The effect of differentiated direct tax subsidy: employment and insurance. LE (HE) denotes
groups with low (high) education, BS denotes the baseline.
The first row of Table 4 shows that the elimination of tax exclusion results in the
unraveling in the employer-based market: the take-up rate drops from 94.2% to 6.3%.
At the same time, the uninsurance rate increases to 62.4% (Row 1 of Table 5). This
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suggests that tax subsidies are an important mechanism to maintain good risk-sharing
inside the employer-based pool.31
It is important to point out that there is some evidence that the adverse selection
pressure in community rated markets (especially with voluntary participation) is rather
strong. The first piece of evidence comes from the policy episode of early 1990s, when
several states in the US introduced community rating regulation in the individual health
insurance market. Clemens (2014) finds that these restrictions significantly decreased
health insurance coverage and this coverage decline escalated over several years con-
sistent with the adverse selection spiral scenario. Moreover, he finds that the market
unraveling has stopped once states with community rating started expanding Medicaid.
This happened because many unhealthy individuals switched from private to public insur-
ance resulting in better average health among the remaining participants of the individual
market. The second piece of evidence comes from episodes of the adverse selection against
a specific health insurance plan in the employer-based market. The notable case of the
complete unraveling happened in mid-1990s in Harvard University (for a full description
see Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998). Harvard offered two insurance plans that significantly
differed in their generosity but initially costed almost the same to the employees. In
mid-1990s the premiums of the two plans diverged, which triggered the adverse selection
spiral: more healthy people were choosing cheaper but less generous plan resulting in
worse risk composition among those purchasing more generous plan, which increased its
premium. This trend reinforced itself every year and eventually the generous plan was
disbanded.
To provide intuition behind our result of the unraveling of the ESHI market, Figure
(9) compares the risk-adjusted premiums in the individual market with out-of-pocket
costs of ESHI in the baseline economy. The out-of-pocket costs of ESHI (pOOP ) are
defined in the following way:
pOOP = p(1− ψ) + ∆Tax
where p(1−ψ) is the employee’s contribution and ∆Tax is the difference in tax payments
resulting from the purchase of ESHI, ∆Tax = Taxi
′
H
=G−Taxi
′
H
6=G. If the ESHI premium
is excluded from the taxable income, an individual can save on taxes by buying employer-
based insurance, i.e. ∆Tax < 0. If the tax exclusion is removed, an individual buying
ESHI has to pay additional taxes since employers’ contributions are now counted as
taxable income, i.e. ∆Tax > 0.
The difference between the out-of-pocket ESHI costs with and without tax exclusion
31Jeske in Kitao (2009) find that the elimination of tax exclusion results in a less dramatic unraveling
of the ESHI market. This difference is due to the fact that they abstract from age dimension which
substantially reduces the amount of cross-subsidization in the ESHI pool.
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is large enough to trigger the adverse selection spiral. As shown in Figure (9), for young
people in the two lowest medical expenses grids (i.e. with medical expenses less than
60th percentile) the out-of-pocket costs of ESHI exceed their risk-adjusted prices in the
individual market after the tax subsidy is removed.32 These people initiate the unraveling
by dropping out of the employer-based market and this leads to an increase in the ESHI
premium and further unraveling of the pool.
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Figure 9: Individual premiums for people in different medical expense grids vs. average out-of-pocket
costs of ESHI with and without tax exclusion.
Another observation from Figure (9) is that for older people and people in the high
medical costs grids the out-of-pocket costs of ESHI are substantially lower than their risk-
adjusted individual premiums even when tax exclusion is removed. These people enjoy
large implicit cross-subsidies from people with low expected medical costs and they have
incentives to buy ESHI even without tax subsidies. Figure (10) illustrates this point
further by showing the markup that individuals with different expected medical costs
face in the ESHI pool. The markup is measured as a percentage difference between the
risk-adjusted price in the individual market and the out-of-pocket costs of ESI.33 The
negative markup means that an individual is overpaying compared to his risk-adjusted
price, thus cross-subsidizing other participants in the pool, whereas the positive markup
means that an individual is cross-subsidized. The solid lines in Figure (10) show that
community rating imposes a large burden on healthy people younger than 35 years old -
their markup can be as large as -250%. In contrast, people above the age of 60 with bad
health enjoy a discount of around 90% off their risk-adjusted price when they participate
in the group market. We will explore the possibilities of designing subsidies that take
32When constructing Figure (9), the premium used to compute pOOP after removing the tax exclusion
is fixed as in the baseline. After the unraveling starts this price will substantially increase.
33More specifically, the markup is computed as 100% ∗
pI(xt, t)− p
OOP
pI(xt, t)
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this cross-subsidization into account in the next section.
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Figure 10: Markup for people in different medical expense grids in the ESHI market. The solid lines
are the markup in a single pool in the baseline economy. The dashed lines are the markup in case when
ESHI premiums are age-adjusted.
6.2 The effects of direct differentiated subsidies
In this section we consider an alternative subsidy scheme that only targets at people
with weak incentives to participate in the ESHI pool. More specifically, we remove
the tax exclusion of the ESHI premium and introduce a direct differentiated subsidy
instead. This subsidy compensates people with low expected medical costs more because
in the pool they cross-subsidize people with high expected medical costs. The subsidy is
determined in the following way:
subsi = max
{
0, pOOP −
EM(xt, t)
1 + r
}
.
An individual with a positive subsidy receives a difference between his actuarially fair
price
EM(xt, t)
1 + r
and his out-of-pocket costs of ESHI, pOOP . Note that only individuals
who are likely to leave the pool if they are not subsidized get a positive subsidy.
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The results of the implementation of this subsidy scheme are presented in the second
row of Table 4. The differentiation of the subsidy results in a small decrease in the
take-up rate: from 94.2% to 85.4%.34 At the same time, the total spending on these
direct subsidies represents only 26.4% of the tax expenditures used to keep the ESHI
pool together in the baseline economy.35 In other words, removing the subsidy from
those who have already been cross-subsidized inside the pool results in almost the same
level of risk-sharing at one fourth of the costs.
The left panel of Figure (11) illustrates how the size of the subsidy varies by age
and health. Not surprisingly, people who get the highest subsidies are those younger
than 35 years old and in the lowest medical cost grid (with medical expense below 30th
percentile). These people have the lowest expected medical expenses and are the most
disadvantageous group in the employer-based pool (see the left panel of Figure (10)),
and therefore they should get the highest compensation. It is important to point out
that people aged over 55 and those in medical cost grids 4 and 5 (with medical expenses
higher than 90th percentile) never get subsidized yet they still remain in the pool. This
suggests the inefficiency of uniform subsidization.
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Figure 11: Differentiated subsidies in case of one pool (left panel) and age pool (right panel). On the
left panel the lines for medical cost grids 3 to 5 lie on the horizontal axis. On the right panel the lines
for medical cost grids 2 to 5 lie on the horizon axis.
The left panel of Figure (11) illustrates that young healthy people are the most
“costly”participants in the community-rated pool because they have to be subsidized a
34Note that not all individuals are willing to buy health insurance even at actuarially fair prices. This
happens because health insurance covers only part of the medical costs. At the same time, uninsured
individuals can rely on government means-tested transfers provided through the consumption minimum
floor. Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2011) illustrate the effect of the consumption floor on the insurance
demand in more detail.
35In the baseline economy the costs to keep the pool together represent the tax revenue forgone because
of the tax exclusion. It is computed as follows:
∫ [
TaxND (s)− Tax (s)
]
Γ (s). In the economy with the
differentiated subsidy scheme these costs are the direct subsidy spending.
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lot in order to stay in the pool. This happens because all people face the same premium
in uniform community rating. Since the expected medical costs increase steeply with age
this implies a large cross-subsidization from the young to the old. The whole system of
transfers inside this pool can be summarized as follows: the young cross-subsidize the
old and the government directly subsidizes the young in order for them to stay in the
pool. In contrast, if community rating in the ESHI market is age-adjusted, there will
be no cross-subsidization from the young to the old but only from the healthy to the
unhealthy. Since the difference in expected medical costs between healthy and unhealthy
individuals of the same age is smaller than this difference between the healthy young and
the unhealthy old, age-adjusted pools imply less cross-subsidization and thus less direct
subsidies are needed to maintain a high participation rate in the pool.
In the next experiment we consider the above differentiated subsidy scheme when we
introduce age-adjusted community rating in the group market, i.e. we allow the ESHI
premium to depend on age (but not on the current medical costs) of an individual. Thus
the ESHI premium in Eq (16) is replaced by age-dependent premium as indicated below:
p
(
t̂
)
= (1 + r)−1γ
(∫
t=t̂
1{i′H (s)=G}
EM (xt, t) Γ (s)
)
∫
t=t̂
1{i′H (s)=G}
Γ (s)
.
The third row in Table 4 shows that the implementation of the differentiated subsidy
scheme together with the age-adjusting community rating results in the take-up rate
equal to 90.0% (comparing to 94.2% in the baseline). Importantly, the total spending on
subsidies now represents only 16.2% of the tax expenditures in the baseline economy. In
other words, when cross-subsidization along the dimension of age is removed it is much
cheaper to maintain good risk-sharing in the employer-based market. The dashed lines
in Figure (10) show that the markup that young people face in age-adjusted community
rating is much lower than that in uniform community rating. As the right panel of Figure
(11) illustrates, now only people in the lowest medical cost grid (those with medical
expenses below 30th percentile) can get a direct subsidy. The amount of this subsidy
increases with age because the expected medical expenses of people in the first medical
cost grid increase much slower with age than the average medical expenses. As they age,
people who stay in the lowest medical cost grid need a higher compensation in order to
agree to pool their risks with people in higher medical cost grids.
6.3 Reforming the current tax exclusion of ESHI premiums
The previous section illustrates that we can use direct differentiated subsidies to
maintain good risk-sharing in the employer-based pool at relatively low costs. In this
section we investigate if the current tax subsidy can be modified in order to achieve a
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similar outcome. Tax exclusion is a less flexible instrument than direct subsidy. However,
one result from the previous section that can still be applied is that only people with
weak incentives to participate in the ESHI pool should be subsidized. To mimic this
result we consider a tax subsidy reform that only targets at people who receive the direct
subsidy in the experiment described in Section 6.2. At the same time, we remove tax
exclusion from people who do not get any direct subsidy.36
ESI take-up (%) Subsidy Tax rate Agg K
All LE HE (% BS) τ y (%) (% BS)
Baseline (pre-ACA economy) 94.2 81.6 95.3 100.0 6.86 100.0
1. No tax subsidy 6.3 4.0 6.5 0.0 6.07 103.8
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
2. (xt=1 and age≤55) or (xt=2 and age≤43) 92.5 70.8 94.3 43.9 6.15 100.6
3. xt=1 + age-adj CR 97.1 81.3 98.5 34.6 5.89 101.5
Table 6: The effects of tax subsidy reforms. LE (HE) denotes groups with low (high) education, BS
denotes the baseline.
The left panel of Figure (11) illustrates that in the direct differentiated subsidy scheme
two groups get subsidized: people in the lowest medical expense grid (with medical
expenses below 30th percentile) and younger than 55 years old, as well as people in
the second lowest medical expense grid (with medical expense above 30th percentile
but below 60th percentile) and younger than 43 years old. To imitate these results we
consider a policy where only these two groups are allowed to keep the tax exclusion. The
second row of Table 6 illustrates the effect of this reform (Table 10 in Appendix B shows
the effect on the employment and insurance status). Allowing young and healthy people
to keep the tax exclusion prevents the ESHI pool from unraveling: the take-up rate is
92.5% which is only 2% lower than in the baseline. At the same time, the costs of the
tax subsidy go down more than twice comparing to the baseline level (43.9%).37 Note
that even though these savings are considerable, they are not as high as in the case of
direct differentiated subsidies. This happens because the size of the tax subsidy (unlike
the size of the direct subsidy) cannot be adjusted for individual risks. The left panel
of Figure (11) shows that the size of the direct subsidy decreases steeply with age and
this represents a significant source of savings because older people need less incentives in
order to join the pool.
The results in Section 6.2 demonstrate that a high participation rate in the ESHI pool
36In this experiment the taxable income and tax payments are determined according to equations (8)
and (9) for the ESHI participants that are allowed to keep the tax exclusion, and according to equations
(21) and (22) for the rest of the ESHI participants.
37In each experiment considered in Tables 6 and 7, we evaluate the total subsidy spending (or forgone
tax revenue) from
∫ [
TaxND (s)− Tax (s)
]
Γ (s) where tax parameters are the equilibrium tax rate in
that economy. Note that for individuals who are not allowed to keep the tax exclusion TaxND = Tax.
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can be achieved at significantly smaller costs if community rating in the ESHI market is
age-adjusted. In the next experiment we introduce age-adjusted premiums in the ESHI
market. At the same time, we allow only people in the lowest medical expense grid (with
medical expense below 30th percentile) to keep the tax exclusion since only this group
receives direct subsidies in this case as shown in the right panel of Figure (11). Row
3 of Table 6 shows that this reform results in the take-up rate slightly higher than the
baseline level (97.1%). At the same time, the costs of these tax subsidies represent only
one third (34.6%) of the baseline level.
6.4 Elimination of the tax exclusion after the ACA
This section considers the effects of our proposed tax exclusion reform after the im-
plementation of the ACA. The main changes that the ACA introduces to the economy
are as follows. First, there will be age-adjusted community rating in the individual mar-
ket meaning that premiums can only depend on age but not on the health conditions
of individuals. Second, low-income people will get subsidies to buy health insurance in
the individual market. The subsidy will be determined based on a sliding scale. People
with income below 133% of FPL will get the highest subsidy while people with income
above 400% of FPL will not get any subsidy. Third, the income eligibility threshold for
the general Medicaid program (ycat) will increase to 133% of FPL. Fourth, people who
stay uninsured will have to pay penalties. Appendix C details how the ACA changes our
baseline model.
ESI take-up (%) Subsidy Tax rate Agg K
All LE HE (% BS) τ y (%) (% BS)
Post-ACA economy 94.2 75.6 95.9 100.0 6.86 100
1. No tax subsidy 52.6 31.6 54.4 0.0 5.70 99.6
2. No tax subsidy, no penalties 5.3 3.8 5.4 0.0 6.44 104.2
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
3. (xt=1 and age≤55) or (xt=2 and age≤43) 93.6 72.5 95.5 47.0 6.32 100.1
4. xt=1 + age-adjusted CR 94.4 74.3 96.2 35.8 6.22 101.5
Table 7: The effects of the partial removal of tax exclusion after the ACA. LE (HE) denotes groups
with low (high) education, BS denotes the baseline.
The first row of Table 7 reports the ESHI take-up rate for the long-run equilibrium
after the implementation of the ACA. Table 11 in Appendix B reports the employment
and insurance statistics. We will use this economy as a reference when comparing the
effect of the tax subsidy reforms after the ACA is implemented. When implementing the
ACA we assume that all additional government spending needed to pay for subsidies and
expanding Medicaid are financed by increasing the progressive income tax. This increase
31
disproportionably falls on high-income people to reflect that the important source of
the ACA financing comes from levying higher taxes on the rich. More specifically, we
adjust the parameter a0 of the tax function to balance the government budget during the
implementation of the ACA. As a result, this parameter increases from 0.258 (baseline
level) to 0.285. The resulting average tax rate for a person with average income increases
by 1.2 percentage point.38
Row 1 of Table 7 shows the effects of the complete elimination of tax exclusion after
the reform (Table 11 in Appendix B reports corresponding changes in the employment
and insurance). In contrast to the economy before the ACA, removing tax subsidies does
not lead to the full unraveling of the employer-based pool: the take-up rate decreases
only to 52.6%. Row 2 of Table 7 shows that this high take-up rate is due to the penalty
for being uninsured: if the penalty is removed the elimination of the tax subsidy brings
the take-up rate down to 5.3%.
Row 3 of Table 7 shows the effects of the reform that allows only two groups to keep
the tax exclusion: people in the lowest medical expense grid (with medical expenses
below 30th percentile) who are younger than 55 years old, as well as people in the second
lowest medical expense grid (with expenses between 30th and 60th percentiles) who are
younger than 43 years old. This tax subsidy reform results in a slightly lower take-up rate
(93.6% comparing to 94.2%) but the tax expenditures constitute less than half (47%) of
the post-ACA baseline level.
Row 4 of Table 7 shows the results of targeting tax exclusion only at people in the
lowest grid of medical expenses combined with age-adjustment of premiums in the ESHI
market. As before, this policy achieves good risk-pooling with the least costs: the take-up
rate is the same as in the post-ACA baseline (around 94%) while the tax expenditures
constitute 35.8% of the post-ACA baseline level.
6.5 Welfare effects
The important finding from Sections 6.3 and 6.4 is that the reform that achieves good
risk-sharing in the ESHI market at the lowest costs involves two steps: i) the existing
tax subsidy should be targeted only at low-risk people, and ii) ESHI premiums should
be age-adjusted. This section evaluates the welfare effects of this tax subsidy reform and
compares them with those when tax exclusion is completely eliminated. Rows 1 and 4
of Table 8 show that the complete elimination of the tax subsidy results in substantial
ex-ante welfare losses both in the pre-ACA and post-ACA economies: the consumption
equivalent variations (CEV) are equal to -0.46% and -0.36% of the annual consumption
38For a full analysis of the effects of the ACA on the economy, see Pashchenko and Porapakkarm
(2013a).
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correspondingly.39 There is heterogeneity in welfare effects by educational group: people
with high education lose around 1% of the annual consumption while people with low
education gain. Many people in the latter group do not have access to the employer-based
market so they do not suffer from its unraveling. Instead they can enjoy a lower tax rate
due to lower government tax expenditures.
CEV (%) Subsidy Tax rate ESHI
All LE HE (%BS) τ y(%) Take-up
Before ACA
Pre-ACA baseline - - - 100.0 6.86 94.2
1.No tax subsidy -0.46 0.27 -1.08 0.0 6.07 6.03
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
2. xt=1 + age-adj CR 0.18 0.41 -0.01 34.6 5.89 97.1
3. xt=1 and income<2*FPL+age-adj CR 0.61 0.79 0.46 42.4 5.89 98.5
After ACA
Post-ACA baseline - - - 100.0 6.86 94.2
4. No tax subsidy -0.36 0.41 -0.98 0.0 5.70 52.6
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
5. xt=1 + age-adj CR -0.15 0.16 -0.40 35.8 6.22 94.4
6. xt=1 and income<2*FPL+age-adj CR 0.13 0.42 -0.11 42.0 6.23 94.7
Table 8: Ex-ante welfare of newborns for different policy experiments
Rows 2 and 5 of Table 8 show the welfare effects of the tax reform that combines
age-adjusted community rating in the ESHI market with the removal of tax exclusion
from all people except those in the lowest medical cost grid. Before the ACA this tax
subsidy reform brings positive welfare gains (0.18%) while after the ACA the welfare
effects become negative (-0.15%). In general, this policy withdraws subsidies from all
people whose medical expenses are not in the bottom 30% of the medical expense distri-
bution regardless of their income. However, even though the average income of the ESHI
pool participants is relatively high, there is substantial income heterogeneity. The loss of
tax subsidies by low-income people with high medical costs negatively affects welfare. At
the same time, the introduction of age-adjusted premiums in the ESHI market positively
affects welfare because it results in the decrease of ESHI premiums for young people,
many of whom have low income.40 Before the implementation of the ACA the positive
39Let V B and V E denote the value function of a newborn in the baseline and the experimental
economy correspondingly. The CEV can be defined as:
CEV = 100 ∗
[
1−
(
V B
V E
) 1
χ(1−σ)
]
The resulting number represents the percentage of the annual consumption a newborn in the experimental
economy is willing to give up in order to be indifferent between the baseline and experimental economies.
The positive number implies welfare gains.
40The introduction of the age-adjusted community rating in the ESHI market in the baseline economy
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welfare effect from age-adjusted ESHI premiums offsets the negative welfare effect from
withdrawing tax subsidies from low-income people. In contrast, after the ACA the op-
posite is true because the tax rate is higher, thus the size of the tax subsidy is higher
as well. Withdrawing this subsidy from the low income group yields more noticeable
welfare effect that cannot be fully offset by the age-adjustment of premiums in the group
market.
To improve the welfare outcomes we extend the tax subsidy to people with income
below 200% of FPL. Rows 3 and 6 of Table 8 show the welfare effects of this modified
policy before and after the ACA. Before the ACA the resulting welfare gains increase to
0.61% and after the ACA - to 0.13%. However, tax expenditures do not increase much:
before the ACA the tax expenditures increase from 34.6% to 42.4% of the baseline level
and after the ACA - from 35.8% to 42.0% of the level of the post-ACA baseline. In other
words, both before and after the ACA the spending on tax subsidies can be decreased
by almost 60% without unraveling of the employer-based market and without decreasing
the welfare. To achieve these results it is important i) to target tax subsidies at people
with low expected medical expenses and people with low income, and ii) to allow for
age-adjusted premiums in the group market.
6.6 Implementation
The essence of our policy proposal is that instead of subsidizing all people buying
employer-based insurance the tax subsidy should be targeted only to a group of relatively
healthy people. When it comes to the implementation of this policy, the question is how to
identify the group of people who should get the tax subsidy. Our suggestion is to subsidize
people whose current medical expenses are close to zero.41 This approach should result
in very low administrative costs. The ACA requires each individual to obtain health
insurance or pay a penalty. Individuals with insurance have to get a certificate from
their insurance company confirming they are insured. For those individuals who want
to get the tax subsidy the certificate proving they are insured can be combined with the
statement of their medical expenses in the current period.
In general, it is possible to use additional criteria to target people whose presence in
the pool is important to keep the premium low. For example, health insurance companies
providing employer-based insurance accumulate information on the usage of health care
for participating employee. This information can also be used to determine eligibility for
tax subsidies. What we show in this paper the total amount of unnecessary subsidization
results in ex-ante welfare gains equivalent to 0.27% of the annual consumption.
41More specifically, we suggest to target subsidies to people whose medical expenses are below 30th
percentile of the medical expense distribution of their age. Figure (5) shows that people in this group
have almost zero medical spending over most of their life-cycle.
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is quite large and even targeting subsidies based on rather rough risk classification can
achieve non-trivial tax savings.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the possible reform of the current tax subsidy for people
who buy employer-based health insurance. We show that even though the complete
elimination of tax subsidies leads to the unraveling of the employer-based market, there
is room for substantial savings on the tax expenditure by targeting tax subsidies. We
show that good risk-pooling in the employer-based market can be achieved at much lower
costs if the tax code takes into account the fact that people have different incentives to
participate in the employer-based pool. In the employer-based market, high-risk people
get implicit cross-subsidies from low-risk people and are willing to join the pool even
without any subsidies. In contrast, for low-risk people the employer-based insurance
pool is less attractive. By building on this intuition we propose a tax subsidy reform
that can maintain the same level of risk-pooling in the group market as in the baseline
economy but at one third of the costs. In order to achieve these results only people in the
bottom 30% of medical expenses distribution should be allowed to keep the tax exclusion.
In addition, the premiums in the group market should be age-adjusted in order to remove
cross-subsidies from the young to the old and to make the ESHI pool more attractive
for the young. In order to improve the welfare outcome of this reform it is important to
extend tax exclusion to people with income below 200% of FPL which increase the tax
expenditure to around 40% of the baseline level.
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A Summary of the parametrization of the baseline
model
Parameters set outside the model
Parameter name Notation Value Source
Risk aversion σ 5 -
Consumption share κ 0.6 French (2005)
Cobb-Douglas parameter α 0.33 Capital share in output
Labor supply l 0.4 -
Cutoff medical expenses xt 90th percentile -
Consumption floor c $2,700 De Nardi et al., 2010
Tax function parameters: a0 0.258 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
a1 0.768 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
Social Security replacement rates:
Below High-School ss1 40% -
High-School & College ss2 30% -
Insurance loads γ 1.11 Kahn et all (2005)
Medicaid income threshold:
Medicaid ycat 64% Data
Medically Needy yneed 53% Data
Asset test for Medically Needy kpub $2,000 Data
Medicare premium pmed $1,055 Total premiums =2.11% of Y
Productivity shock:
Persistence parameter ρ 0.98 Heathcote et al (2010)
Variance of innovations σ2ε 0.018 Heathcote et al (2010)
Variance of transitory shock σ2ξ 0.10 Erosa et al (2011)
Parameters used to match some targets
Parameter name Notation Value Source/Target
Discount factor β 0.992
K
Y
= 3
Depreciation rate δ 0.07 r = 0.04
Population growth η 1.35% % of people older than 65
Tax function parameter a2 0.652 Balanced government budget
Proportional tax τ y 6.62% Composition of tax revenue
Fixed costs for insurance pi $22.7 % of individually insured
Employer contribution ψ 76.3% ESHI take-up rate
Fixed costs of work Employment profiles
Healthy:
low education φ1(1) 0.2800
high education φ1(2) 0.2650
Unhealthy, low educ: φ2(t, 1)
intercept - 0.0200
slope - 0.0008
Unhealthy, high educ: φ2(t, 2)
intercept - 0.0450
slope - 0.0025
Table 9: Parameters of the model
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B The effect of tax exclusion reform on employment
and insurance statistics
Table 10 shows the change in the insurance and employment behavior as a result of
the tax subsidy reform before the ACA. Table 11 shows these changes after the ACA.
Employment (%) Insurance (%)
All LE HE Unins Indiv MCD
Baseline 89.7 75.6 92.2 19.7 7.3 8.6
1. No tax subsidy 86.9 74.7 89.2 62.4 22.7 10.8
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
2. (xt=1 and age ≤55) or (xt=2 and age ≤43) 88.9 75.3 91.4 20.8 7.7 9.1
3. xt=1 + age-adj CR 88.9 75.5 91.3 18.1 7.5 9.1
4. xt=1 and income<2*FPL + age-adj CR 89.5 76.3 91.8 17.3 7.3 8.5
Table 10: The effects of tax subsidy reform before the ACA
Employment (%) Insurance (%)
All LE HE Unins Indiv MCD
Post-ACA baseline 89.1 79.8 90.8 8.9 18.5 10.1
1. No tax subsidy 88.3 79.9 89.8 31.1 24.2 10.4
Tax subsidy only to a certain group:
2. (xt=1 and age≤55) or (xt=2 and age≤43) 88.6 79.8 90.1 9.6 18.8 10.3
3. xt=1 + age-adj CR 88.3 79.8 89.8 8.8 19.5 10.1
4. xt=1 and income<2*FPL + age-adj CR 88.6 80.1 90.0 8.6 19.2 10.1
Table 11: The effects of tax subsidy reform after the ACA
C Changes introduced by the ACA
This section describes how the ACA provisions change the baseline model.
C.1 Household problem
After the reform, a working-age household may be subject to penalties if he stays
uninsured or may receive subsidies to buy individual health insurance. In addition, more
households will be eligible for Medicaid. The eligibility for subsidies and the Medicaid
expansion depends on a household’s total income (ytott ); whereas penalties are a function
of the taxable income (yt). We can rewrite the budget constraint of a working-age
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household (4) in the following way:
kt (1 + r) + w˜ z
e,x
t lt + T
SI
t +Beqe + Sub(y
tot
t , i
′
H) = (1 + τ c) ct + kt+1+
xt (1− q (xt, it)) + Pt + Tax+ Pen(yt, i
′
H). (23)
Here Sub(ytott , i
′
H) and Pen(yt, i
′
H) are subsidies and penalties correspondingly. A house-
hold with income above 400% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) cannot get subsidies.
People having income below 400% of FPL and receiving an ESHI offer are eligible for
premium subsidies in the individual market only if their employee’s contribution (p) ex-
ceeds 9.5% of their total income. The subsidy structure ensures that individuals within
a certain income category do not spend more than a certain fraction of their income on
health insurance. More specifically, spending on individual insurance premiums is limited
to the percentage of total income shown in Table 12.42
Maximum premium spending (% of income) Income categories (% of FPL)
2.0 <133
3.5 133-150
5.2 150-200
7.2 200-250
8.8 250-300
9.5 300-400
Table 12: Maximum spending on individual insurance as a percentage of total income after receiving
subsidies
The income eligibility threshold for the general Medicaid program is increased to
133% of FPL. There are no changes in the Medically Needy program.
An uninsured person whose insurance premium in the individual market is less than
8% of his income has to pay a penalty. The penalty is determined as
Pen(yt, i
′
H) = max{0.025yt, $695} if i
′
H = U
C.2 Insurance sector after the reform
The reform imposes a heavy regulation on the individual insurance market. Insurance
companies can no longer condition premiums on the current medical cost of individuals.
42The subsidy function specified in the Bill is slightly more complicated: for each income category it
specifies the range of maximum premium spending as a fraction of income. We approximate this range
by selecting the midpoint of a corresponding interval. For example, the range for the income category
133-150% of FPL is 3-4% and we approximate it by the midpoint 3.5%.
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The insurance premium of an individual of age t̂ will be determined by
pI
(
t̂
)
= (1 + r)−1γ
(∫
t=t̂
1{i′H (s)=I}
EM (xt, t) Γ (s)
)
∫
t=t̂
1{i′H (s)=I}
Γ (s)
+ pi.
Thus, after the reform the individual market premium pI will be a function of age only.
C.3 Government constraint
We maintain the assumption that the government runs a balanced budget. This
implies ∫
[Tax (s) + τ cct (s)] Γ (s)−G+
∫
t<R
Pen(yt, i
′
H)Γ (s) =∫
t≥R
[sse + qmed (xt) xt − pmed] Γ (s) +
∫
T SIt Γ (s) +
∫
t<R
1{i′H=M}
q (xt, 1)xtΓ (s)
+
∫
t<R
Sub(ytott , i
′
H)Γ (s)
The left-hand side now has an additional source of revenue - penalties from those unwilling
to purchase insurance. The right-hand side has an additional expenditure - subsidies.
To balance the government budget we adjust T (yt) to make it more progressive.
43 More
specifically, to achieve a balanced budget in the economy with the ACA provisions in
place, we adjust the parameter a0 which controls the marginal tax rate faced by the
highest income group.
43More specifically, the Bill increases hospital insurance payroll tax on people with income above
$200,000 by 0.9% and imposes a 3.8% tax on unearned income for higher-income tax-payers (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2011). Our calibration strategy assumes a standard log-normal income process
commonly used in macro-literature, which cannot generate the empirical fraction of top earners. Because
of this we increase the progressivity of the general tax code to capture the main idea of financing the
reform by taxing the rich more.
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